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1. Introduction
The assignment game was introduced by Shapley and Shubik [11] as a
cooperative model for a market with buyers and sellers. Each seller has one
indivisible good or “object” to sell, and each buyer wants to buy at most
one object. Objects are distinct and buyers may value them differently. The
valuation matrix summarizes the profit that each mixed-pair can attain by
the trade of the object between them. The worth of the grand coalition is the
total profit that can be obtained by optimally matching buyers to sellers, and
the worth of any other coalition is obtained in a similar way, just restricting
attention to the corresponding submatrix.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [14] introduced the first solution con-
cept for general cooperative games, based on a dominance relation between
imputations, i.e. individually rational allocations of the worth of the grand
coalition. One imputation dominates another if each member of a given coali-
tion gets strictly more in the first imputation than in the second one, and
these payoffs are feasible for this coalition.
A von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (a stable set) V is a set of impu-
tations satisfying (i) internal stability: no coalition objects to an imputation
in V by proposing a dominating imputation in V , and (ii) external stability:
each imputation outside V is objected to by some coalition that proposes a
dominating imputation in V . According to von Neumann and Morgenstern,
each stable set represents a standard of behavior. Trivially, each stable set
of a game contains the core, that is, the set of undominated imputations
(Gillies, [3]). Stable sets are difficult to characterize (Aumann, [1]) and they
may not exist. Lucas ([5]) provides examples of games with no stable set.
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Although the core, in preference to the stable sets, has become the most
common solution applied to cooperative games, we argue in the present paper
that the core is not sufficient to analyze all the bargaining possibilities of the
agents in an assignment market.
Assume that, after an optimal matching has been agreed on, one buyer
decides to pay nothing for his assigned good. His assigned seller turns to the
remaining agents but, if he finds himself unmatched in the resulting subgame,
we may assume the buyer can obtain the object at a null price. Once this
buyer has left the market, the remaining agents can share the profit of their
partnership according to a core element of the subgame. This imputation,
which may be outside the core of the initial game, is undominated by any
core element. We show that imputations of this kind2 form a stable set of
the assignment game.
Consequently, our main result is the proof of the existence of stable sets for
the assignment game. The proof is constructive and the stable set is formed
by particular imputations of the sort described in the paragraph above. We
derive one stable set associated with each optimal matching of the market,
and this stable set is the only one that excludes third-party payments with
respect to this optimal matching.
The stable sets we characterize are very closely connected to the notion
of the core, since they enlarge the core by taking into consideration the core
elements of some submarkets. By doing so, these stable sets overcome some
drawbacks the core alone may present. When we choose the core as a solu-
2See Definition 3.1 and the concept of extended core in (4).
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tion we exclude an imputation if it is dominated by some other imputation,
although this other imputation may also be outside the core. An example
of this situation is provided by the “glove market”, a symmetric assignment
market with constant valuation matrix. In a glove market with fewer sell-
ers than buyers, the unique core allocation gives all the profit to the sellers,
while buyers get zero, not taking into account the fact that sellers need the
cooperation of at least a buyer to make any profit. Moreover, this unique
core allocation does not dominate any other imputation. Similar situations
appear in general assignment markets.
In [10], Shapley describes most of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable
sets of a glove market. In Shubik [12], and also in some personal notes of
Shapley,3 a set of imputations is claimed as a stable set for the assignment
game. However, this claim is not accompanied by a complete proof. The
present paper closes this gap and establishes the existence of von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable sets for assignment games.
The set defined by Shubik consists of the union of the core of the assign-
ment market and the cores of some selected submarkets that are compatible
with an optimal matching which has been fixed beforehand. The stability
of this set is proved in Section 3 (part of the proof is consigned to the sup-
plemental material). In Section 2 the basic definitions regarding assignment
games are given. Section 4 concludes with some remarks.
3We thank professor T. Solymosi for providing us with these notes.
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2. Preliminaries
In an assignment market, a product that comes in indivisible units is on
sale, and each agent either supplies or demands exactly one unit. Thus, the
set of agents is partitioned into a finite set of buyers M and a finite set of
sellers M ′. The profit each mixed-pair (i, j) ∈ M ×M ′ can attain is given
by the valuation matrix A = (aij)(i,j)∈M×M ′.
A matching for the market (M,M ′, A) is a bijection µ between a subset
of M and a subset of M ′. We denote by M(M,M ′) this set of matchings.
An optimal matching is a matching µ ∈ M(M,M ′) such that
∑
(i,j)∈µ aij ≥∑
(i,j)∈µ′ aij for all µ
′ ∈ M(M,M ′). We denote by M∗A(M,M
′) the set of
optimal matchings for (M,M ′, A). If (i, j) ∈ µ we say that i and j are
matched (or assigned) by µ and we also write j = µ(i) and i = µ−1(j). If for
some buyer i ∈ M there is no j ∈ M ′ such that (i, j) ∈ µ we say that i is
unmatched (or unassigned) by µ (and similarly for sellers).
Given S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M ′, we denote by µ|S×T the restriction of µ ∈
M(M,M ′) to the pairs in S × T . Moreover, we denote by M(S, T ) and
M∗A(S, T ) the set of matchings and optimal matchings of the submarket
(S, T, A|S×T ) defined by the subset S of buyers, the subset T of sellers and
the restriction of A to S × T . If S = ∅ or T = ∅, then the only possible
matching in M(S, T ) is µ = ∅ and by convention
∑
(i,j)∈∅ aij = 0.
The cooperative game (M ∪M ′, wA) for the assignment market is defined
by the set of players M ∪M ′ and the characteristic function wA(S ∪ T ) =
max{
∑
(i,j)∈µ aij | µ ∈ M(S, T )}, for all S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M
′. The assign-
ment game is square if and only if its valuation matrix is square, that is, if
there are as many buyers as sellers.
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Given an assignment game (M ∪ M ′, wA), a payoff vector is (u, v) ∈
R
M × RM
′
, where ui stands for the payoff to buyer i ∈ M and vj stands for
the payoff to seller j ∈ M ′. An imputation is a non-negative payoff vector
that is efficient,
∑
i∈M ui +
∑
j∈M ′ vj = wA(M ∪M
′). We denote by I(wA)
the set of imputations of the assignment game (M ∪M ′, wA).
A binary relation is defined on the set of imputations. If (u, v), (u′, v′) ∈
I(wA), we say (u
′, v′) dominates (u, v), and write (u′, v′) domwA(u, v), if and
only if there exists (i, j) ∈ M ×M ′ such that (u′, v′) domwA{i,j}(u, v), that is to
say, u′i > ui, v
′
j > vj and u
′
i + v
′
j ≤ aij.
4 When no confusion regarding the
game arises, we simply write (u′, v′) dom (u, v).
A subset V of imputations is a stable set (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
[14]) if it is internally stable (for all (u, v), (u′, v′) ∈ V , (u′, v′) does not
dominate (u, v)) and externally stable (for all (u, v) ∈ I(wA) \V , there exists
(u′, v′) ∈ V such that (u′, v′) dom (u, v)).
The core is also defined by means of the above dominance relation as the
set of undominated imputations. Shapley and Shubik ( [11]) prove that an
assignment game (M∪M ′, wA) always has a non-empty core. Moreover, with
any optimal matching µ ∈ M∗A(M,M
′) fixed, a non-negative payoff vector
(u, v) ∈ RM+ ×R
M ′
+ is in the core of (M∪M
′, wA) if and only if ui+vj ≥ aij for
all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′, ui + vj = aij for all (i, j) ∈ µ, and all agents unmatched
by µ get a null payoff.
Two particular core allocations are the buyers-optimal core allocation
(uA, vA) where each buyer obtains her maximum core payoff, and each seller
4For assignment games, this dominance relation via mixed-pair coalitions is equivalent
to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s classical dominance relation.
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his minimum one, and the sellers-optimal core allocation (uA, vA) where each
seller obtains his maximum core payoff and each buyer her minimum one.
Solymosi and Raghavan ([13]) prove that the core of an assignment game
(M ∪M ′, wA) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if u
A
i = 0
for all i ∈ M and vAj = 0 for all j ∈ M
′. When the assignment matrix is
square, this is equivalent to saying that each matrix entry corresponding to
an optimal pair is a row and column maximum.
In Nu´n˜ez and Rafels [6], it is shown that given an assignment game (M ∪
M ′, wA), there exists another (and unique) assignment game (M ∪M
′, wAr)
with the same core, C(wA) = C(wAr), and the property that for all (i, j) ∈
M ×M ′ there exists (x, y) ∈ C(wAr) = C(wA) such that xi + yj = a
r
ij. This
game is defined by arij = min(u,v)∈C(wA) ui + vj for all (i, j) ∈ M ×M
′, and
matrix Ar is the buyer-seller exact representative of matrix A. When there
are as many buyers as sellers and µ ∈ M∗A(M,M
′) is an optimal matching
that does not leave agents unassigned, Ar can also be obtained only in terms
of the entries of the original valuation matrix:
arij = max
{k1,...,kr}⊆M\{i,µ−1(j)}
{aiµ(k1)+ak1µ(k2)+· · ·+akrj−ak1µ(k1)−· · ·−akrµ(kr)}.
(1)
Expression (1) will be repeatedly used in the proof of the main theorem.
Finally, the matrix Ae is defined, for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′, by
aeij = a
r
ij − u
A
i − v
A
j . (2)
This matrix Ae is introduced in Nu´n˜ez and Rafels [7] and its associated
assignment game (M ∪M ′, wAe) has two properties that are relevant for our
purposes: C(wA) = {(u
A, vA)}+C(wAe) and C(wAe) is the unique stable set
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of the game (M ∪M ′, wAe).
In the paper, we will mainly focus on those imputations where, as happens
to the core, transfers of money are only made between matched agents. Given
an assignment game (M∪M ′, wA) and an optimal matching µ ∈M
∗
A(M,M
′),
(u, v) ∈ RM+ ×R
M ′
+ belongs to the µ-principal sectionB
µ(wA) if and only if ui+
vj = aij for all (i, j) ∈ µ, while unmatched agents get zero. The domination
relation between imputations in the µ-principal section is preserved if we
make the market square by adding dummy agents on the short side (that is,
zero row/columns to the matrix).
3. The main result
In this section we define the notion of a compatible subgame, introduced
in Shubik [12], and prove how the cores of these subgames determine a stable
set for the assignment game.
Definition 3.1. Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be an assignment game, µ ∈M
∗
A(M,M
′)
and let I ⊆M and J ⊆M ′. The subgame ((M \I)∪(M ′\J)), wA|(M\I)×(M′\J))
is a µ-compatible subgame of (M ∪M ′, wA) if and only if
wA((M\I)∪(M
′\J))+
∑
i∈I
i assigned by µ
aiµ(i)+
∑
j∈J
j assigned by µ
aµ−1(j)j = wA(M∪M
′). (3)
Notice that, for any assignment game and any optimal matching µ, there
always exist µ-compatible subgames5 (just take I = J = ∅).
We write wA−I∪J for the characteristic function of the subgame with player
set (M\I)∪(M ′\J). To say that ((M\I)∪(M ′\J), wA−I∪J ) is a µ-compatible
5Properties of the µ-compatible subgames can be found in the supplemental material.
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subgame is equivalent to saying that the restriction of µ to (M \I)× (M ′ \J)
is still optimal for the resulting submarket and whenever an agent has been
excluded (let us say i ∈ I), his partner remains in the submarket (µ(i) 6∈ J),
unless aiµ(i) = 0.
Given an assignment game (M∪M ′, wA) and µ ∈M
∗
A(M,M
′), if for some
I ⊆M and J ⊆M ′ the subgame ((M \I)∪(M ′\J), wA−I∪J ) is µ-compatible,
then Cˆ(wA−I∪J ) is its extended core,
Cˆ(wA−I∪J ) =


(u, v) ∈ Bµ(wA)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(u−I , v−J) ∈ C(wA−I∪J ),
ui = aiµ(i) for all i ∈ I assigned by µ,
vj = aµ−1(j)j for all j ∈ J assigned by µ


(4)
The claim in Shubik [12] is that, for any optimal matching µ, we should
add to the core of the game (M ∪M ′, wA) the extended cores of all its µ-
compatible subgames to obtain a stable set. Let us denote by CµA the set of
pairs (I, J), I ⊆M and J ⊆M ′, such that ((M \ I) ∪ (M ′ \ J), wA−I∪J ) is a
µ-compatible subgame of (M ∪M ′, wA).
Theorem 3.1. Let (M∪M ′, wA) be an assignment game and µ ∈M
∗
A(M,M
′)
an optimal matching. The set
V µ(wA) =
⋃
(I,J)∈CµA
Cˆ(wA−I∪J ) (5)
is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set of (M ∪M ′, wA).
Proof. On page 207 of Shubik [12] it is proved that V µ(wA) is undominated
by any imputation in the µ-principal section, which implies the internal sta-
bility of V µ(wA), and that any imputation outside the µ-principal section is
dominated by an element in V µ(wA).
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We will complete the proof of the external stability of V µ(wA) by stating
and proving three claims. Before that, and since C(wA) ⊆ V
µ(wA), we define
the subset Rµ(wA) of the µ-principal section formed by allocations in which
each agent is paid an amount in between his/her minimum and maximum
core payoff: given an assignment game (M ∪M ′, wA) and µ ∈M
∗
A(M,M
′),
Rµ(wA) = {(u, v) ∈ B
µ(wA) | u
A
i ≤ ui ≤ u
A
i for all i ∈M}. (6)
Consequently, for all (u, v) ∈ Rµ(wA) it also holds v
A
j ≤ vj ≤ v
A
j for all
j ∈ M ′.
Notice that C(wA) ⊆ R
µ(wA) ⊆ B
µ(wA) ⊆ I(wA). We first claim that
any imputation in Rµ(wA) \ V
µ(wA) is dominated by a core allocation of
(M ∪M ′, wA).
Claim 3.1. Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be an assignment game and µ ∈M
∗
A(M,M
′).
For all (u, v) ∈ Rµ(wA) \ V
µ(wA), there exists (u
′, v′) ∈ C(wA) such that
(u′, v′) domwA(u, v).
Proof of Claim 3.1 We may assume without loss of generality that A is
a square matrix, and that µ does not leave agents unassigned, since both
C(wA) and R
µ(wA) allow for this simplification. Let (M ∪M
′, wAe) be the
related exact assignment game and remember from (2) that aeij = a
r
ij − u
A
i −
vAj for all i ∈ M , j ∈ M
′. Notice first that (u, v) ∈ Rµ(wA) \ V
µ(wA)
implies (u, v) ∈ Rµ(wA) \ C(wA). Since µ is also an optimal matching for
(M,M ′, Ae) and for (M,M ′, Ar), and C(wA) = {(u
A, vA)} + C(wAe), given
(u, v) ∈ Rµ(wA) \ C(wA), we have (u− u
A, v − vA) ∈ Bµ(wAe) \ C(wAe).
Since (M ∪M ′, wAe) has a stable core, there exist (u
′′, v′′) ∈ C(wAe) and
(i∗, j∗) ∈M ×M ′ such that (u′′, v′′) domwAe{i∗,j∗}(u− u
A, v − vA).
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This means that
u′′i∗ > ui∗ − u
A
i∗ , v
′′
j∗ > vj∗ − v
A
j∗, and u
′′
i∗ + v
′′
j∗ ≤ a
e
i∗j∗. (7)
Let us now define
(u˜, v˜) = (u′′, v′′) + (uA, vA). (8)
Notice that (u˜, v˜) ∈ C(wA) = C(wAr) and, by (7),
u˜i∗ = u
′′
i∗ + u
A
i∗ > ui∗, v˜j∗ = v
′′
j∗ + v
A
j∗ > vj∗ and u˜i∗ + v˜j∗ ≤ a
r
i∗j∗ , (9)
which implies (u˜, v˜) domwAr{i∗,j∗}(u, v). We must prove that (u, v) is also dom-
inated by a core allocation in terms of the game wA instead of wAr . From
(1), either ari∗j∗ = ai∗j∗ and we are done, or
u˜i∗+ v˜j∗ ≤ a
r
i∗j∗ = ai∗µ(i1)+ai1µ(i2)+ · · ·+airj∗−ai1µ(i1)−ai2µ(i2)−· · ·−airµ(ir)
for some distinct i1, i2, . . . , ir ∈M \ {i
∗, µ−1(j∗)}.
In this case, since (u˜, v˜) ∈ Bµ(wA), u˜il+ v˜µ(il) = ailµ(il) for l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}
we obtain
u˜i∗ + v˜j∗ + u˜i1 + v˜µ(i1) + · · ·+ u˜ir + v˜µ(ir) ≤ ai∗µ(i1) + ai1µ(i2) + · · ·+ airj∗ .
Together with (u˜, v˜) ∈ C(wA), this implies u˜i∗+v˜µ(i1) = ai∗µ(i1), u˜il+v˜µ(il+1) =
ailµ(il+1) for all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1} and u˜ir + v˜j∗ = airj∗.
• If v˜µ(i1) > vµ(i1), and since, by (9), u˜i∗ > ui∗ , we are done because
(u˜, v˜) domwA{i∗,µ(i1)}(u, v). Otherwise, that is v˜µ(i1) ≤ vµ(i1), we analyze three
cases.
• If v˜µ(i1) = vµ(i1) = v
A
µ(i1)
, then, since (u˜, v˜) and (uA, vA) belong to C(wA),
uAi∗ ≤ u˜i∗ = ai∗µ(i1) − v˜µ(i1) = ai∗µ(i1) − v
A
µ(i1)
≤ uAi∗ .
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But then, by (9), ui∗ < u˜i∗ = u
A
i∗ contradicts (u, v) ∈ R
µ(wA).
• If v˜µ(i1) = vµ(i1) < v
A
µ(i1)
, define
uεi = u˜i − ε and v
ε
µ(i) = v˜µ(i) + ε for all i ∈M such that v˜µ(i) < v
A
µ(i),
uεi = u˜i and v
ε
µ(i) = v˜µ(i) for all i ∈M such that v˜µ(i) = v
A
µ(i).
Notice that, for ε > 0 small enough (uε, vε) ∈ C(wA). Indeed, if v˜µ(i) < v
A
µ(i),
we have u˜i > u
A
i ≥ 0. Also, if v˜µ(i) < v
A
µ(i) and v˜j = v
A
j , we prove that
u˜i+v˜j > aij and thus, for ε > 0 small enough, u
ε
i+v
ε
j ≥ aij . The reason is that
if v˜j = v
A
j and u˜i+v˜j = aij , then u
A
i ≤ u˜i = aij−v˜j = aij−v
A
j ≤ u
A
i , where the
last inequality follows from (uA, vA) ∈ C(wA). Thus u˜i = u
A
i , but this implies
v˜µ(i) = v
A
µ(i), in contradiction with the assumption. Moreover, since u˜i∗ >
ui∗ ≥ u
A
i∗ , we have v˜µ(i∗) < v
A
µ(i∗) which implies the existence of ε > 0 small
enough we so that (uε, vε) ∈ C(wA) with u
ε
i∗ > ui∗ , v
ε
µ(i1)
> v˜µ(i1) = vµ(i1) and
uεi∗ + v
ε
µ(i1)
= u˜i∗ + v˜µ(i1) = ai∗µ(i1). Therefore (u
ε, vε) domwA{i∗,µ(i1)}(u, v).
• If v˜µ(i1) < vµ(i1), then, since both (u˜, v˜) and (u, v) are in the µ-principal
section, u˜i1 > ui1. We then repeat the argument above with the mixed
pair {i1, µ(i2)}. Either we find that there exists (u
′, v′) ∈ C(wA) such that
(u′, v′) domwA{il,µ(il+1)}(u, v) for some l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1} or we reach u˜ir > uir
and, since v˜j∗ > vj∗ and u˜ir + v˜j∗ = airj∗, we obtain (u˜, v˜) dom
wA
{ir,j∗}
(u, v).
This concludes the proof of Claim 3.1. It remains to prove external stabil-
ity for elements in the µ-principal section but outside the limits of individual
core bounds. We do this first under some additional assumptions.
Claim 3.2. Let (M∪M ′, wA) be a square assignment game and µ ∈ M
∗
A(M,M
′).
If aij > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ µ, then any (u, v) ∈ B
µ(wA) \ (R
µ(wA) ∪ V
µ(wA))
is dominated by some element of V µ(wA).
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The proof of this claim is consigned to Appendix B in the supplemental
material since it is rather long and technical. In this proof, among other
results on assignment games, we make use of Claim 3.1 above.
Notice that this completes the stability of V µ(wA) for square assignment
markets where all optimal pairs make a positive profit. We only need to
extend this to the remaining assignment games.
Claim 3.3. Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be an assignment game, µ ∈M
∗
A(M,M
′) and
assume that there exists i ∈ M such that aiµ(i) = 0 or there exist unassigned
agents. Then V µ(wA) is a stable set.
Proof of Claim 3.3
In this case, let I = {i ∈ M | aiµ(i) = 0 or i is unmatched by µ} and
J = {j ∈ M ′ | aµ−1(j)j = 0 or j is unmatched by µ}. With some abuse of
notation, we denote by µ the restriction of µ to (M \I)×(M ′\J). Then, if we
consider the submarket ((M\I)∪(M ′\J), wA′) where A
′ = A|(M\I)×(M ′\J), we
are under the assumptions of Claim 3.2 and we already know that V µ(wA′) =⋃
(R,S)∈Cµ
A′
Cˆ(wA′−R∪S) is a stable set of ((M \ I)∪ (M
′ \ J), wA′). Notice also
that
Bµ(wA) =

(u, v) ∈ R
M × RM
′
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(u−I , v−J) ∈ B
µ(wA′),
ui = 0 for all i ∈ I, vj = 0 for all j ∈ J

 .
We now claim
V µ(wA) =

(u, v) ∈ R
M × RM
′
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(u−I , v−J) ∈ V
µ(wA′),
ui = 0 for all i ∈ I, vj = 0 for all j ∈ J


(10)
and it is a stable set for the initial market (M ∪M ′, wA). Let us denote by
Vˆ µ(wA′) the right-hand side of (10).
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To prove the above equality, notice first that ((M \I)∪(M ′\J), wA−I∪J ) is
a µ-compatible subgame of (M∪M ′, wA). Moreover, because of the definition
of the sets I and J , any µ-compatible subgame of ((M\I)∪(M ′\J), wA−I∪J) is
also a µ-compatible subgame of (M∪M ′, wA). Therefore Vˆ
µ(wA′) ⊆ V
µ(wA).
Now, if there existed (u, v) ∈ V µ(wA) \ Vˆ
µ(wA′), then (u−I , v−J) ∈ I(wA′) \
V µ(wA′) and the external stability of V
µ(wA′) would imply the existence
of (u′−I , v
′
−J) ∈ V
µ(wA′) such that (u
′
−I , v
′
−J) dom
wA′ (u−I , v−J). The usual
completion of (u′−I , v
′
−J) by giving null payoffs to agents in I ∪ J leads to
(u′, v′) ∈ Vˆ µ(wA′) ⊆ V
µ(wA) which dominates (u, v), in contradiction to the
known internal stability of V µ(wA). Once obtained that V
µ(wA) = Vˆ
µ(wA′),
the internal and external stability of this set follow straightforwardly from
those of V µ(wA′). ✷
Hence, we have proved that any assignment game has a von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable set (in fact there exists one for each optimal matching).
Let us illustrate this main result with an example of assignment game pro-
posed in Shapley and Shubik [11].
Example 3.1. Let M = {1, 2, 3} be the set of buyers, M ′ = {1′, 2′, 3′} be
the set of sellers, and the valuation matrix be
1’ 2’ 3’
1
2
3
5 8 2
7 9 6
2 3 0
The only optimal matching is µ = {(1, 2′), (2, 3′), (3, 1′)} and the non-trivial
µ-compatible subgames wA−I∪J are defined by the following pairs (I, J):
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I = {2}, J = ∅ I = ∅, J = {1′} I = {2}, J = {1′}
I = {2, 3}, J = ∅ I = ∅, J = {1′, 2′}
To obtain a µ-compatible subgame, usually I and J cannot be simulta-
neously non-empty. The reason is that if agents of both sides of the market
are removed (and these are not unassigned agents), then their optimal part-
ners by µ tend to become matched in the submarket and this in general
contradicts the fact that the restriction of µ is an optimal matching of the
submarket. There are, nevertheless, exceptions that occur either when the
market is not square and one of the removed agents is an unassigned agent on
the large side, or when i ∈ I ∩ µ−1(M ′), j ∈ J ∩ µ(M) and aµ−1(j)µ(i) = 0, as
is the case in the present example with I = {2} and J = {1′}, since a33 = 0.
The claimed von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set (see Figure 1) is
V µ(wA) = C(wA)∪Cˆ(wA−{2})∪Cˆ(wA−{2,3})∪Cˆ(wA−{1′})∪Cˆ(wA−{1′2′})∪Cˆ(wA−{2,1′}).
0
1
2
0 2 4 6 8
0
6
2
4
3 5
5
u3(= 2− v1)
u1(= 8− v2)
u2(= 6− v3)
A B
C
D
E
F
Figure 1:
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The parallelepiped [0, 8] × [0, 6] × [0, 2] is the projection of the principal
section Bµ(wA) to the space of the buyers’ payoff. To obtain the sellers’
payoffs, remember that µ = {(1, 2′), (2, 3′), (3, 1′)}, and ui + vµ(i) = aiµ(i) for
all i ∈ M and (u, v) ∈ Bµ(wA). Inside this parallelepiped we represent the
core C(wA) in dark grey. The shaded area in the face u2 = a23 = 6 is the
extended core of one µ-compatible subgame, Cˆ(wA−{2}); and the shaded area
in the face v1 = a31 = 2 (or u3 = 0) is Cˆ(wA−{1′}). The segment [A,B]
is Cˆ(wA−{2,3}), while the segment [C,D] is Cˆ(wA−{1′2′}). In this example,
Cˆ(wA−{2,1′}) = [E, F ] ⊆ Cˆ(wA−{1′}).
4. Concluding remarks
The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set V µ(wA) we have proved to
exist for the assignment game (M ∪M ′, wA) is the only one in the µ-principal
section. The reason is that, by Shubik [12], no imputation in V µ(wA) can be
dominated by another imputation in the µ-principal section.
Proposition 4.1 (Shubik, 1984). Let (M∪M ′, wA) be an assignment game
and µ ∈M∗A(M,M
′) an optimal matching. The only stable set that excludes
third-party payments (according to µ) is V µ(wA).
Such stable sets represent a quite natural standard of behavior: once an
optimal matching µ has been agreed on, if some agents leave the market
with the whole profit of their respective partnerships in such a way that their
partners remain in the market6 and the restriction of the selected matching is
6When aiµ(i) = 0 for some i ∈M , both partners may leave the market.
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still optimal for the submarket, then the remaining agents allocate the profit
of the submarket following the core principle of undomination.
There are, however, many other stable sets of the assignment game outside
the µ-principal sections. It is possible to find examples in markets with at
most two agents on each side. Moreover, Shapley [10] describes infinitely
many stable sets for the symmetric assignment games (glove markets).
All these stable sets are complete lattices7 with respect to the same partial
order.
Given (u, v), (u′, v′) ∈ I(wA), we say (u, v) ≤M (u
′, v′) if and only if
ui ≤ u
′
i for all i ∈ M and vj ≥ v
′
j for all j ∈ M
′. It is not difficult to prove
that the stable set V µ(wA) is a complete lattice with respect to ≤M , but in
fact this result is more general.
Proposition 4.2. Every stable set of an assignment game is a complete lat-
tice with respect to ≤M .
The proof is based on the fact that no stable set of an assignment game with
at least three agents contains an open set of the imputation set. To see this,
we only need to follow the proof of Shapley [10] for the symmetric case.
The lattice property is something the stable sets of the assignment game
have in common with the stable sets of the one-to-one matching problems
(the marriage problem), as proved recently by Ehlers [2].
Finally, the present paper suggests a procedure that may be useful for
obtaining stable sets for other classes of games. We may look for stable sets
that are the union of the core of the game and the extended cores of certain
7See Shapley and Shubik [11] for a definition of a complete lattice in this setting.
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subgames. For instance, this procedure could be useful for looking for stable
sets in markets with one seller who owns several objects and several buyers
on the opposite side who demand one unit each, or even in the more general
assignment markets (with several sellers) of Kaneko [4].
Also in the marriage problem (see Roth and Sotomayor, [9]) it would be
interesting to analyze whether a stable set can be obtained by enlarging the
set of stable matchings by adding stable matchings of certain submarkets.
This would be even more interesting in some generalizations of the marriage
market that may have an empty core, as is the case of many-to-one match-
ing markets or three-sided matching markets, as well as in the multisided
generalization of the assignment game (Quint, [8]).
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